Shine《光能》雜志2011年12月刊封面報(bào)道：施正榮——不妥協(xié)的老大

在這篇文章的開(kāi)頭，我要申明一點(diǎn)，這也許是第一次沒(méi)有將注意力集中在一家企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力而是放在了企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人身上，這并非是一篇傾向性的報(bào)道，而實(shí)在是施正榮所代表的,已經(jīng)超出了尚德本身。

相信很多人知道“光伏”這個(gè)詞是因?yàn)槭┱龢s，從對(duì)2005年中國(guó)首富的關(guān)注，到對(duì)這個(gè)行業(yè)的好奇，再到投身于這個(gè)行業(yè)，6年的時(shí)間，無(wú)數(shù)的資本和懷揣夢(mèng)想的淘金者跨入這個(gè)行業(yè)，潮起潮落間，施正榮一直站在風(fēng)口浪尖。

很多人和企業(yè)與筆者一樣，都是從其它兄弟行業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)入光伏。記得在2006年初，中國(guó)政府從“資源換美元”中如夢(mèng)初醒，開(kāi)始打壓污染耗能行業(yè)，筆者所從事金屬硅行業(yè)也由于上不起環(huán)保設(shè)備的小企業(yè)眾多，行業(yè)陷入停滯狀態(tài)，那時(shí)一噸加工粗糙的金屬硅售價(jià)1000美元（當(dāng)時(shí)美元匯率大概是8.3），只能賺300-500元人民幣。為了讓讀者更方便理解這個(gè)利潤(rùn)率的概念，筆者舉個(gè)例子：經(jīng)常有企業(yè)在接到訂單后出貨時(shí)，發(fā)現(xiàn)海運(yùn)費(fèi)或是匯率稍微浮動(dòng)一點(diǎn)，最后利潤(rùn)為零甚至是負(fù)數(shù)，所以筆者在08年看到企業(yè)不計(jì)成本的一批批空運(yùn)組件時(shí)才會(huì)瞠目結(jié)舌。

淘汰高污染高耗能的行業(yè)是大勢(shì)所趨，因此筆者在當(dāng)時(shí)也尋求個(gè)人的職業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型，這時(shí)尚德已經(jīng)在西方一片狂歡聲中上市， 施也在圣誕節(jié)前后以186億的資產(chǎn)成為中國(guó)首富。但他真正被國(guó)人熟知卻是在2006年初，在簽約鳥(niǎo)巢項(xiàng)目后，媒體給予了更多的關(guān)注。筆者也是在這個(gè)時(shí)候看到了每公斤1美元的金屬硅賣到國(guó)外提純?yōu)槎嗑Ч韬?，?00美元的價(jià)格被國(guó)人買(mǎi)回來(lái)，在被刺痛的同時(shí)也看到了關(guān)于尚德和施正榮的相關(guān)報(bào)道，當(dāng)然，那時(shí)誰(shuí)也不會(huì)想到在08年三季度，多晶硅的現(xiàn)貨價(jià)格已經(jīng)漲到了近500美元/公斤。

耀眼的布道者

那個(gè)時(shí)候，大眾媒體總是喜歡追朔施的身世，大家也樂(lè)于看到一個(gè)草根英雄的崛起，所以少時(shí)窮困，青年留學(xué)，不惑創(chuàng)業(yè)的施正榮成為“知識(shí)改變命運(yùn)”的代表，典型的海歸技術(shù)英雄。

可以說(shuō)，中國(guó)光伏能有現(xiàn)在的局面，施正榮功不可沒(méi)，業(yè)內(nèi)至少70%的企業(yè)是跟著尚德的足跡踩進(jìn)了這個(gè)行業(yè)。如果覺(jué)得這個(gè)數(shù)字夸張，那么去數(shù)一下現(xiàn)在中國(guó)的光伏企業(yè)有多少是在2005年后成立或者開(kāi)始涉足光伏領(lǐng)域的就知道了。

第一次見(jiàn)到施正榮，是在上海的第二屆SNEC展會(huì)上，尚德給這家展覽公司提供了很大支持。開(kāi)幕儀式結(jié)束后，施和幾位光伏屆的專家被眾星拱月般的媒體團(tuán)團(tuán)圍住，那時(shí)的施正榮給人的感覺(jué)是鋒芒畢露，光彩照人，這是尚德最強(qiáng)盛的時(shí)刻。此時(shí)強(qiáng)如英利、天合，在尚德和施正榮的強(qiáng)大氣場(chǎng)下，也只是紅花邊上的一朵綠葉。

招風(fēng)的大樹(shù)

施正榮一直以行業(yè)老大自詡，從言談上給人的感覺(jué)也是舍我其誰(shuí)的感覺(jué)，對(duì)于中國(guó)光伏業(yè)，他確實(shí)做了很多，包括但不限于尚德的成功模式帶動(dòng)的中國(guó)投資狂潮。

SolarWorld和美國(guó)鋼鐵工人協(xié)會(huì)發(fā)動(dòng)了各種反傾銷，尤其是SolarWorld，從德國(guó)追到美國(guó)，對(duì)此施正榮在2009年赴歐希冀解決爭(zhēng)端，在美國(guó)“301”法案推出時(shí)也四處呼吁。

中國(guó)人好大喜功的惡習(xí)被美國(guó)人當(dāng)真了，光伏企業(yè)獲得的銀行授信被中國(guó)企業(yè)有意無(wú)意、國(guó)外企業(yè)別有用心的當(dāng)做貸款來(lái)看，美方將這點(diǎn)在新一輪的反傾銷調(diào)查中夸大其詞。對(duì)于這些控訴，施正榮表示“光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)需要一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的市場(chǎng)機(jī)制，也包括貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)議的解決機(jī)制。”

實(shí)際上尚德是唯一一個(gè)有機(jī)會(huì)讓中國(guó)光伏行業(yè)出現(xiàn)統(tǒng)一聲音的企業(yè)，從施正榮的言談中也可以透露出他也致力于同行之間的互相合作，但時(shí)至今日，中國(guó)光伏仍然如沙雕的城堡一般，看似龐大壯麗，實(shí)則不堪一擊。雖不能責(zé)怪尚德的不作為，但終究讓人扼腕。究其原因，在于施正榮的性格所致，但我們細(xì)細(xì)分析，卻又不能將問(wèn)題歸結(jié)到施正榮和尚德的頭上。

筆者曾將光伏行業(yè)形容為一桌麻將，政府、國(guó)企、大企業(yè)和小企業(yè)的四方博弈，在這個(gè)賭桌上，國(guó)企的賭資是由政府提供的，而政府和大企業(yè)又暗通款曲，所以小企業(yè)處于孤立無(wú)援的狀態(tài)，這也是國(guó)內(nèi)普遍存在的現(xiàn)象。從乳制品行業(yè)強(qiáng)制上檢測(cè)設(shè)備就可以看出，最后倒下的反而是那些沒(méi)出過(guò)什么問(wèn)題的小企業(yè)。

同時(shí)幾乎所有的政策、標(biāo)準(zhǔn)都是向著大企業(yè)傾斜的，所以小企業(yè)很少愿意參與協(xié)會(huì)等行業(yè)機(jī)構(gòu)，所以在中國(guó)開(kāi)會(huì)，上面坐著的永遠(yuǎn)是那幾家大企業(yè)的負(fù)責(zé)人或高管。因此在今年德國(guó)漢堡和美國(guó)達(dá)拉斯展上，一家小企業(yè)接連爆出“1美元/瓦”和“0.89美元/瓦”的超低價(jià)，筆者在觀察后，發(fā)現(xiàn)該展位幾乎無(wú)人問(wèn)津，但市場(chǎng)價(jià)格卻被整體拉低了。

我們回頭看看國(guó)內(nèi)大廠，如果大廠間能夠達(dá)成協(xié)作共贏的模式，中國(guó)光伏的發(fā)展也會(huì)順利許多，畢竟如果能夠多賺些，沒(méi)人愿意背負(fù)“低價(jià)傾銷”的惡名。但尚德在此卻沒(méi)能成功的收服各路諸侯，換言之，現(xiàn)在的尚德，只不過(guò)是拳頭最大罷了。這是為什么？

逐鹿的鹿

如果把光伏市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)比作群雄逐鹿，那么尚德則扮演著雙重角色，既是最大的諸侯，偶爾也客串下“鹿”的角色。這樣的關(guān)系，讓尚德與同行間的關(guān)系一度緊張。

在尚德上市后，尚德積累了數(shù)年的技術(shù)人員在新晉廠商中無(wú)疑是一座座移動(dòng)著的人型金礦，但以尚德一家企業(yè)是無(wú)法將這些金礦全部挖掘并打造成首飾的，因此一段時(shí)期內(nèi)，無(wú)論是尚德的員工還是管理層都成了獵頭公司的目標(biāo)。

與經(jīng)常與尚德相提并論的英利不同，英利地處北方，處于一家獨(dú)大的狀態(tài)，附近并無(wú)同級(jí)別競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手，許多員工在安家后就不愿去外地工作，而且北方人的戀家情結(jié)也較為嚴(yán)重；尚德所在的江蘇省則群雄并起，員工去其它單位工作很方便，同時(shí)南方人更愿意為賺錢(qián)多付出努力。更重要的是，英利走的是貼近國(guó)企模式的路線，這樣給中國(guó)人更多的歸屬感；尚德在這方面則是力圖打造國(guó)際化的團(tuán)隊(duì)，更好的適應(yīng)光伏行業(yè)高度國(guó)際化的特點(diǎn)，但這也讓員工流動(dòng)性也高度“國(guó)際化”。一個(gè)很好的例子可以證明這點(diǎn)：英利在金融危機(jī)和現(xiàn)在的市場(chǎng)低谷時(shí)，都喊出了“不降薪，不裁員”的口號(hào)，而尚德則變相裁員來(lái)化解危機(jī)。

這些年陸續(xù)從尚德被其它企業(yè)挖走或離職的高管有：

楊懷進(jìn)，與施同樣從澳洲留學(xué)，并與其回國(guó)創(chuàng)業(yè)，后陸續(xù)于南京中電（中電光伏前身）、晶澳太陽(yáng)能任職，后任海潤(rùn)光伏CEO，幫助海潤(rùn)成功上市。

張鳳鳴、泰德，施正榮在澳洲的同事，陸續(xù)離職后與楊懷進(jìn)一起進(jìn)入中電光伏，與趙建華夫婦共事，張鳳鳴現(xiàn)任天威首席技術(shù)官，泰德在臺(tái)創(chuàng)立旭泓全球光電。

王漢飛，尚德第一名職業(yè)經(jīng)理人，當(dāng)時(shí)尚德科研人員齊備，政府關(guān)系由無(wú)錫政府給予支持，前董事長(zhǎng)李延人出面打理，王漢飛作為施正榮的助手，做了大量工作。后受林洋（韓華新能源前身）老板陸永華邀請(qǐng)，2004年年中離開(kāi)尚德，助林洋在美國(guó)納斯達(dá)克上市?？上в捎诜e勞成疾，2008年7月在睡夢(mèng)中英年早逝。他的去世讓陸永華悲痛萬(wàn)分，在光伏行業(yè)的心氣也低了許多，后低調(diào)分兩次轉(zhuǎn)讓全部股權(quán)。

邵華千，從創(chuàng)業(yè)初期的施正榮秘書(shū)做到副總裁，她的離去讓施正榮頗為惋惜。

陳立志，于尚德工作5年，后出任尚德美國(guó)公司副總裁，負(fù)責(zé)美洲業(yè)務(wù)拓展，在今年7月閃電離職。

張怡，尚德CFO，于今年離職。

至于中層和一線操作工人，流失情況更為嚴(yán)重，這也造成了尚德與各家企業(yè)間的矛盾雖未擺在明面上，但卻一直存在。

正如一個(gè)硬幣的兩面，尚德員工離職也并非全部來(lái)自外部的招攬。

施正榮與天合CEO高紀(jì)凡同樣推崇走國(guó)際化路線，他們會(huì)經(jīng)常強(qiáng)調(diào)尚德或天合都不只是一個(gè)中國(guó)公司，而應(yīng)該看作一個(gè)國(guó)際化的公司（而事實(shí)也確實(shí)如此，上市的中國(guó)光伏企業(yè)中，中國(guó)人的股權(quán)只占一小部分，而施又要算是澳籍）。他們都醉心于打造一個(gè)國(guó)際化的團(tuán)隊(duì)，所以在天合和尚德隨處可見(jiàn)外籍員工擔(dān)任管理和對(duì)外事務(wù)的工作。

施正榮、高紀(jì)凡等人為中國(guó)光伏業(yè)每一次政策實(shí)施和調(diào)整功不可沒(méi)，而且成功的讓中國(guó)政府重視光伏行業(yè)對(duì)于節(jié)能減排的意義，中國(guó)光伏發(fā)展計(jì)劃從無(wú)到有，直至現(xiàn)在的2020年50GW的發(fā)展目標(biāo)，他們一次次的游說(shuō)，并邀請(qǐng)政府官員到廠參觀，證明光伏是清潔的、能夠幫助中國(guó)進(jìn)行產(chǎn)業(yè)轉(zhuǎn)型的新興產(chǎn)業(yè)。中國(guó)的光伏行業(yè)到今年能夠啟動(dòng)，施和高可以說(shuō)是最大功臣。

但尚德和天合對(duì)于國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)的態(tài)度都可以歸納為“關(guān)注但不投入”，兩家對(duì)中國(guó)市場(chǎng)的關(guān)注度與國(guó)外市場(chǎng)相差甚遠(yuǎn)，對(duì)于市場(chǎng)方面，兩家均傾向于走上層路線：與政府打好關(guān)系，等利好政策出臺(tái)時(shí)自然分到一杯羹。

但如果要進(jìn)一步打開(kāi)國(guó)際市場(chǎng)，施正榮需要更加國(guó)際化的團(tuán)隊(duì)。在路透社網(wǎng)站公布的尚德高管列表中，首席財(cái)務(wù)官David來(lái)自美國(guó)博克德（BECHTEL）公司，上一份工作是在Tetra tech公司；John Lefebvre于9月26日任美國(guó)公司總裁，曾在SolarCity和GE工作；Andrew Beebe，首席商務(wù)官，畢業(yè)于美國(guó)最知名常青藤大學(xué)之一——達(dá)特茅斯。其余各位高管除謝曉南擁有無(wú)錫政府背景外，也均來(lái)自國(guó)際知名公司和新南威爾士大學(xué)。

大批的空降部隊(duì)帶來(lái)了讓尚德在國(guó)際市場(chǎng)暢通無(wú)阻，但也帶來(lái)新的問(wèn)題：如何在老員工和“空降兵”之間一碗水端平？施正榮曾說(shuō)：“我能用中國(guó)人肯定用中國(guó)人，但尚德面對(duì)的是歐美市場(chǎng)的客戶，又不是中國(guó)的煤礦區(qū)。”但他在一心憧憬著將尚德國(guó)際化之時(shí)，卻似乎忽略了這些“煤礦工人”掌握著尚德的科研、財(cái)務(wù)、客戶和政府關(guān)系等方方面面。當(dāng)了解中國(guó)，懂得中國(guó)管理模式的“煤礦工人”離職后，尚德的制度、理念傳達(dá)很容易在中間層形成真空地帶。有件事情是可以參考的，尚德今年頒發(fā)給設(shè)備實(shí)驗(yàn)室經(jīng)理劉懷林100萬(wàn)元大獎(jiǎng)，說(shuō)明施正榮對(duì)科技進(jìn)步的重視，但里面有個(gè)細(xì)節(jié)：劉懷林為了保證公司產(chǎn)品安全，把房子抵押給銀行獲得80萬(wàn)元的貸款，之后研發(fā)工作才得以進(jìn)行。以施正榮對(duì)研發(fā)工作的專注，劉懷林為何不向上申報(bào)科研經(jīng)費(fèi)？

而且“空投部隊(duì)”之前是“空軍”，現(xiàn)在成為“陸軍”后如何把心態(tài)調(diào)整過(guò)來(lái)，對(duì)尚德是否有那么深厚的感情都是未知數(shù)，之前尚德2006-2007年間高薪聘請(qǐng)的來(lái)自BP、西門(mén)子、普華永道等企業(yè)的中高層員工已經(jīng)離職過(guò)半。

這其中體現(xiàn)了施正榮矛盾的心態(tài)，一方面，他希望尚德能夠永遠(yuǎn)保持那種爆發(fā)式的增長(zhǎng)，另一方面也希望老員工能夠跟上他的國(guó)際化進(jìn)程，但即使是施正榮本人，在管理上面也會(huì)犯錯(cuò)誤，這個(gè)問(wèn)題不是尚德獨(dú)有，而是行業(yè)發(fā)展得過(guò)快，從幾十MW的小廠到中國(guó)首富，再到金融危機(jī)和2010年的市場(chǎng)爆發(fā)，加上大家都想到會(huì)出現(xiàn)但沒(méi)想到這么嚴(yán)重的行業(yè)低谷，光伏行業(yè)的陷阱和機(jī)遇一樣多。專業(yè)分析機(jī)構(gòu)Solarbuzz的高級(jí)分析師廉銳博士也說(shuō)：“這個(gè)行業(yè)的不確定性太大，所以也請(qǐng)大家對(duì)我們預(yù)測(cè)的偏差給予理解。”施正榮也意識(shí)到這個(gè)問(wèn)題，對(duì)媒體稱在物色一個(gè)CEO，但這談何容易？

不妥協(xié)的老大

施正榮的“老大”情結(jié)是業(yè)內(nèi)公認(rèn)的，當(dāng)然，這一路走來(lái)，也只有尚德具備這個(gè)資格稱為老大。但他卻沒(méi)能成為教父這樣的角色，而更像是教父性格火爆、熱愛(ài)家庭的長(zhǎng)子桑尼。

在尚德上市的艱難過(guò)程中，國(guó)企背景過(guò)重是在美上市的一大阻礙，施正榮為此不惜與前董事長(zhǎng)李延人矛盾激化，最后在無(wú)錫政府的幫助下，讓小天鵝等原始股東退出，李延人黯然離職，這使無(wú)錫工商界對(duì)施正榮頗多微詞。雖然不是當(dāng)事人，無(wú)意對(duì)此做出評(píng)價(jià)，但冷靜下來(lái)想想，不如此，尚德還能夠成為現(xiàn)在的尚德么？

在行業(yè)快速發(fā)展時(shí)，施正榮警告行業(yè)會(huì)出現(xiàn)過(guò)剩，大多數(shù)人認(rèn)為這是其想嚇退競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手而無(wú)人領(lǐng)情；在英利爆出“6毛9”的超低價(jià)時(shí)，他數(shù)次在近千人的會(huì)議上嘲諷此事，雖然這件事的是非功過(guò)很難評(píng)說(shuō)，而且據(jù)了解這是英利給國(guó)投電力的價(jià)格，是否國(guó)電報(bào)錯(cuò)也有待證實(shí)，但以施的身份，這些言辭只是折了他的氣度。

從這幾年的觀察，施正榮的性格可以總結(jié)為：一個(gè)直率而有些莽撞、不妥協(xié)的理想主義者。

正是這樣的性格，也讓施正榮雖然一直在呼吁行業(yè)自律，但卻應(yīng)者寥寥。他自己也承認(rèn)：”我們一定要避免一種觀念：把對(duì)手整死我才能活好。這種想法很幼稚，你不可能把別人整死?，F(xiàn)在，這個(gè)行業(yè)不斷有新進(jìn)入者進(jìn)來(lái)，我的建議是：要理性地分析產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展趨勢(shì)和自己的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)優(yōu)勢(shì)。“本應(yīng)作為行業(yè)仲裁者的尚德，卻經(jīng)常在看到不滿的事情后就拿起武器沖在最前面，這讓他四處樹(shù)敵。

業(yè)內(nèi)流傳著這樣的一個(gè)事情：施正榮曾有意當(dāng)選某新能源協(xié)會(huì)會(huì)長(zhǎng)一職，但由于有人稱其是澳籍，不符合規(guī)定，最后受阻。

施正榮也被看成是業(yè)內(nèi)最著名的毒舌之一，原因在于：他經(jīng)常會(huì)說(shuō)些包括市場(chǎng)悲觀預(yù)期和對(duì)業(yè)內(nèi)一些現(xiàn)象的批評(píng)，他自稱會(huì)經(jīng)常發(fā)表些不成熟的預(yù)言。但不幸的是，這些年的歷史證明，他大部分的話是對(duì)的。

“光伏行業(yè)存在泡沫，一個(gè)是財(cái)富效應(yīng)，第二是地方政府推波助瀾。”2007年提出，無(wú)人相信。

“沒(méi)有市場(chǎng)，怎么有工廠！”質(zhì)疑地方政府爭(zhēng)相將光伏業(yè)列為重點(diǎn)產(chǎn)業(yè)。

“薄膜太陽(yáng)能絕對(duì)是泡沫，要分析都是誰(shuí)在炒薄膜概念?這里面有行業(yè)領(lǐng)袖和行業(yè)專家嗎?”2009年施正榮評(píng)薄膜時(shí)惹眾薄膜廠家怒。

“不論什么行業(yè)，只要中國(guó)人進(jìn)入，產(chǎn)能立馬上去。不注重品牌和商業(yè)模式建設(shè)，最后只能‘國(guó)人喝湯，洋人吃肉’。”2009年的預(yù)測(cè)，到現(xiàn)在可以說(shuō)要實(shí)現(xiàn)了，現(xiàn)在乃至未來(lái)，上游環(huán)節(jié)都將維持在極低的利潤(rùn)率。

“歐洲需求下降，明年全球光伏市場(chǎng)將肯定出現(xiàn)過(guò)剩。”發(fā)布于2010年11月。

“光伏產(chǎn)業(yè)還未成形，今天的世界第幾，明天可能什么都不是。”

“明后兩年將會(huì)比較難過(guò)”，我們必須熬過(guò)這兩年冬天。”—— 他預(yù)計(jì)明年太陽(yáng)能電池板的庫(kù)存水平將高達(dá)11GW。

他同樣有很多能引起業(yè)內(nèi)共鳴的語(yǔ)言。比如“大膽”預(yù)測(cè)今年中國(guó)市場(chǎng)將有1.5GW的容量，但他也說(shuō)沒(méi)想到竟然達(dá)到了3個(gè)GW；預(yù)測(cè)電價(jià)達(dá)到一塊錢(qián)一度，現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)實(shí)。尚未得到驗(yàn)證的是他說(shuō)2015年中國(guó)肯定是全球最大市場(chǎng)，年容量8GW-10GW，美國(guó)6個(gè)GW左右，中、美、印將成為最大的光伏市場(chǎng)。

他會(huì)說(shuō)些大家都在說(shuō)的如何度過(guò)行業(yè)危機(jī)，避免惡意競(jìng)爭(zhēng)、建立行業(yè)制度等，他更會(huì)說(shuō)些大家不會(huì)說(shuō)的，如對(duì)于之前國(guó)內(nèi)政策進(jìn)展緩慢的失望，一些官員和政府部門(mén)的不作為，這相比一些四平八穩(wěn)的企業(yè)老總，他實(shí)在是個(gè)異數(shù)。

作為一個(gè)媒體人，一個(gè)旁觀者，尚德前幾年中國(guó)的品牌營(yíng)銷可以說(shuō)不甚成功，對(duì)于施的過(guò)度神話讓人反感，覺(jué)得不切實(shí)際，相比商業(yè)奇才，我更愿把施正榮看成一個(gè)科技致富的英雄，一個(gè)為環(huán)保、為發(fā)展太陽(yáng)能不遺余力的帶理想主義色彩和以行業(yè)發(fā)展為己任的商人（他在對(duì)大眾傳播光伏應(yīng)用上，可以說(shuō)做了極大貢獻(xiàn)），他自己也承認(rèn)，會(huì)迷惑，會(huì)犯錯(cuò)誤，何苦將其包裝成一個(gè)完人？

在英利贊助世界杯后，同樣贊助過(guò)珠峰等體育運(yùn)動(dòng)的尚德對(duì)其表示不看好。更有甚者，某位寫(xiě)手將英利的“英雄的勝利”解釋為“蠅頭小利”，讓人啞然，雖然這應(yīng)該不是出自施正榮的意愿，但進(jìn)一步敗壞了尚德的形象，這點(diǎn)英利做的比較含蓄，只是在反擊的文章中讓讀者自行比較優(yōu)劣，之所以這么說(shuō)的原因在于那些文章中施正榮的信息很容易搜集，但能夠獲得一向低調(diào)的英利CEO苗連生如此詳細(xì)的信息，非內(nèi)部人員不可。

這種情況在施任命張建敏為媒體關(guān)系經(jīng)理后大為改善，現(xiàn)在的尚德，以一種更為寬厚的目光來(lái)看待同業(yè)間的事件、摩擦，也為尚德贏得了更多的尊重。

直面錯(cuò)誤

在9月底舉行的尚德十周年慶典上，一向精神抖擻的施正榮卻顯得有些疲憊，結(jié)構(gòu)調(diào)整，戰(zhàn)略布局和很多的負(fù)面消息讓他休息不夠。他說(shuō)：“過(guò)去十年我們有很多光環(huán)，有很多輝煌，因?yàn)槲覀兪抢洗?，我們也付出了很多老大的代價(jià)，我們也做了很多探索，在探索有成功也有失敗，為后來(lái)者、為第二、第三位提供了很多可借鑒的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。在此同時(shí)我們也受到很多質(zhì)疑，你做老大就要做到很好，我們有時(shí)候也不一定能做好很好，所以媒體的朋友對(duì)我寬容一點(diǎn)。”這為他贏得了熱烈的掌聲，因?yàn)檫@在以前，是不曾有過(guò)的。給筆者的感覺(jué)是他終于從神化的光環(huán)中走出來(lái)，多了些反思和總結(jié)。雖然他的演講仍然屢次強(qiáng)調(diào)尚德的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)地位，但卻讓人會(huì)心一笑而不反感，不如此，他就不是施正榮了。

雖然施正榮承認(rèn)犯過(guò)一些錯(cuò)誤，但有些錯(cuò)誤筆者認(rèn)為并不能歸咎于他，之前沸沸揚(yáng)揚(yáng)的“詐捐”事件冷靜分析下，尚德的操作手法是否正確雖然存疑，但商人的投入總是要回報(bào)的，在做好事的同時(shí)追求利益最大化無(wú)可厚非。

同樣讓尚德顯得有些狼狽的與MEMC終止合約一事，也是非戰(zhàn)之罪。除天合CEO高紀(jì)凡在2008上半年有所警覺(jué)而壯士斷腕，棄已投資千萬(wàn)的多晶硅項(xiàng)目之外，行業(yè)內(nèi)幾乎無(wú)人嗅到金融危機(jī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。包括Q-cells、CSI和南京中電等企業(yè)，也都與多晶硅企業(yè)簽訂了長(zhǎng)單。此次解除供應(yīng)，讓尚德從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)角度看，擺脫了身上的枷鎖，當(dāng)年MEMC在簽訂十年供貨協(xié)議時(shí)，還順帶要了尚德的股份，這次雙方“分手”，一方面應(yīng)該是MEMC不肯議價(jià)，另一方面是尚德有意涉足硅片環(huán)節(jié)以進(jìn)一步降低成本。”2006年我們與它簽合同的時(shí)候，原材料的價(jià)格比市場(chǎng)便宜20%-30%，但后來(lái)我們看到原材料的趨勢(shì)在往下走，如果我們把這份合同執(zhí)行下去，要比現(xiàn)貨價(jià)虧損4個(gè)多億美金。于是我們與MEMC公司商量停止執(zhí)行合同，我們給它一些補(bǔ)償。由于我們5年前已經(jīng)預(yù)付款5700萬(wàn)美金，對(duì)方同意我們?cè)俑?000多萬(wàn)美金就結(jié)束合同?？傆?jì)我們要付出1.1億美金，但可以節(jié)省4億美金。“

今年3月，尚德電力以1.3億美元的高價(jià)，收購(gòu)了硅片制造企業(yè)榮德新能源。榮德新能源前身為輝煌硅能源(也是尚德電力的硅片供應(yīng)商)。根據(jù)尚德的公司規(guī)劃，榮德新能源計(jì)劃總投資10億美元，在2011年上半年形成單晶硅和多晶硅總計(jì)1.23G W的產(chǎn)能，到2011年的年尾組件產(chǎn)能要達(dá)到2.4GW，切片產(chǎn)能達(dá)到1.2GW，也可以這樣說(shuō)，自產(chǎn)切片一直都保持在一半的供應(yīng)產(chǎn)量上。榮德新能源最終將形成3GW的產(chǎn)能數(shù)量。

個(gè)人認(rèn)為施的真正錯(cuò)誤在于投資薄膜電池。在唱衰薄膜短期前景后，施正榮又忍不住上薄膜項(xiàng)目，這可以歸結(jié)為他對(duì)薄膜技術(shù)的感情：做了一輩子薄膜，總想做點(diǎn)突破，而且做慣老大的尚德也難以忍受在可能成為未來(lái)主流的技術(shù)上落后。

從2007年5月到2011年初，浪費(fèi)了大量的時(shí)間和財(cái)力，該項(xiàng)目最終被放棄。做為一個(gè)一直從事薄膜研究，至今喜歡被人稱作施博士的科學(xué)家和一個(gè)成功的商人，如果說(shuō)分析不出該項(xiàng)目的可行性是令人難以置信的。比較有說(shuō)服力的是這個(gè)理想主義者仍然對(duì)老本行念念不忘，即使存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，他也要去冒險(xiǎn)賭一賭。“我是個(gè)理想主義者，今年已年過(guò)半百，還有理想。”施正榮說(shuō)做為一個(gè)探索者，尚德還會(huì)保持這種敢于犯錯(cuò)的勇氣，給后來(lái)者避免犯錯(cuò)，避免曲折的機(jī)會(huì)。

“中國(guó)企業(yè)還是要花更多時(shí)間，并且實(shí)實(shí)在在地把銷售收入中的5%或者8%放在研發(fā)上，那么5年以后中國(guó)再出現(xiàn)一個(gè)被市場(chǎng)認(rèn)可的First Solar是可能的。”可惜，現(xiàn)在的光伏市場(chǎng)生存壓力過(guò)大，留給研發(fā)的空間越來(lái)越小了，像First Solar那樣埋頭研究10年后一鳴驚人的情況已不可復(fù)制。

媒體經(jīng)常拿施正榮和英利的CEO苗連生做比較，反差極大的兩人代表著中外企業(yè)思潮的碰撞。在平穩(wěn)渡過(guò)金融危機(jī)、提前預(yù)知并應(yīng)對(duì)市場(chǎng)寒冬這些方面，苗連生比施正榮強(qiáng)的太多。施正榮說(shuō)最艱難的時(shí)候是創(chuàng)業(yè)初期員工紛紛離開(kāi)，債主上門(mén)討債的，他覺(jué)得非常的窩囊和受人欺負(fù)。但苗從軍退伍后從事過(guò)六七種行業(yè)，二十余年的摸爬滾打，起起伏伏讓他對(duì)于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和市場(chǎng)本質(zhì)的認(rèn)識(shí)在行業(yè)內(nèi)不做第二人選，那些從苗連生創(chuàng)業(yè)就跟隨左右，已經(jīng)身居高位的英利高管中，很多人仍然不吃胡蘿卜，就是因?yàn)樵谑畮啄昵坝⒗具€在賣菜時(shí)，連續(xù)幾個(gè)月用胡蘿卜抵一部分的工資。相比起來(lái)，施正榮的創(chuàng)業(yè)環(huán)境，實(shí)在可以用“天堂”形容。科技英雄、上市公司、中國(guó)首富等各種光環(huán)在很短時(shí)間接踵而來(lái)，作為一個(gè)正常人，施正榮需要時(shí)間去消化和沉淀。

目前輿論和利潤(rùn)狀況都較好的英利實(shí)際上也有自己的難題，之前引以為傲的垂直整合模式被行業(yè)普遍采用，“熊貓計(jì)劃”的成本也偏高，六九硅業(yè)由于多晶硅市場(chǎng)價(jià)格急速下滑而處境尷尬，苗連生的憂患意識(shí)讓英利幾乎總能避免大的受損，不至傷筋動(dòng)骨。

與尚德的模式更為相像的是天合光能，高紀(jì)凡和施正榮都是推崇打造國(guó)際化的公司，都對(duì)別人稱其為中國(guó)公司感到不滿，但天合的運(yùn)營(yíng)幾乎沒(méi)有出過(guò)大的失誤，而且成本控制也比較好，這證明了國(guó)際化路線在中國(guó)是行得通的。高紀(jì)凡的謹(jǐn)慎和對(duì)成本的把控是主要原因。

施正榮的戰(zhàn)略眼光并不只給尚德帶來(lái)空中樓閣般的聲名，還有實(shí)實(shí)在在的好處，當(dāng)時(shí)施正榮力排眾議成立的GSF（Global Sola Fund）為尚德在2010年一季度就獲得投資盈利超2億美元。

而作為一個(gè)毛澤東式的理想主義者，對(duì)施正榮功過(guò)是非的爭(zhēng)議要比業(yè)內(nèi)任何企業(yè)家多得多，如毛一般，他開(kāi)創(chuàng)了一個(gè)時(shí)代，讓光伏行業(yè)得以蓬勃發(fā)展，也讓李源潮等目前在中央身居要職的國(guó)家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)認(rèn)識(shí)到光伏行業(yè)，有望結(jié)束光伏“朝中無(wú)人”的局面；如毛一般，他在后續(xù)建設(shè)發(fā)展中務(wù)實(shí)精神不足，將精力放眼于天下而缺乏細(xì)節(jié)；現(xiàn)在他也如毛一般走下了神壇，這種轉(zhuǎn)變實(shí)際上對(duì)他和尚德來(lái)說(shuō)是件好事情。

無(wú)責(zé)任猜想：尚德會(huì)被收購(gòu)么？

本月韓國(guó)LG與尚德同時(shí)發(fā)表聲明，否認(rèn)之前風(fēng)傳的LG將收購(gòu)尚德一事。實(shí)際上在2009年就有大量的報(bào)道傳言尚德將被收購(gòu)，后來(lái)這些都被事實(shí)打敗，現(xiàn)在的施正榮在回應(yīng)包括尚德破產(chǎn)在內(nèi)的這些傳言時(shí)顯得更加淡定。

我們來(lái)無(wú)責(zé)任猜想一下，如果尚德被收購(gòu)，那么將是哪幾家企業(yè)？收購(gòu)尚德，首先要具備行業(yè)基礎(chǔ)和對(duì)行業(yè)的了解，范圍可以鎖定圈內(nèi)企業(yè)；其次收購(gòu)尚德能夠協(xié)助其降低成本，提高科技創(chuàng)新，所以最有可能的就是多晶硅企業(yè)，收購(gòu)尚德后一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的產(chǎn)業(yè)鏈打造完善，屆時(shí)的尚德將更加可怕。

滿足這兩個(gè)條件的有諸如協(xié)鑫、OCI、REC、Hemlock和Wacker等企業(yè)。但Hemlock和Wacker似乎滿足于在光伏行業(yè)的現(xiàn)狀，因此前三個(gè)企業(yè)的可能性最大。當(dāng)然，筆者認(rèn)為施正榮是不會(huì)將自己的心血出售的，這個(gè)行業(yè)的大企業(yè)中，真正功成身退的只有因王漢飛去世心灰意冷的林洋老板陸詠華，其它人又怎么舍得放手一手打造起來(lái)的數(shù)百億的產(chǎn)業(yè)和更誘人的前景。

也有傳言，尚德目前的負(fù)面消息被有意擴(kuò)大，也是有意收購(gòu)尚德的買(mǎi)家刻意炒作，但事實(shí)究竟如何，尚不得而知。

買(mǎi)點(diǎn)股票？

中國(guó)發(fā)改委能源所所長(zhǎng)李俊峰在尚德十周年的會(huì)上開(kāi)玩笑說(shuō)：“建議大家買(mǎi)點(diǎn)尚德的股票，因?yàn)槟壳鞍ㄉ械略趦?nèi)的光伏企業(yè)股價(jià)已經(jīng)跌至低谷，僅設(shè)備和廠房?jī)r(jià)值就遠(yuǎn)超現(xiàn)在的市值。”李俊峰還沒(méi)有提及尚德的品牌和渠道建設(shè)，這個(gè)價(jià)值則更不容忽視，即使目前的尚德一瓦的產(chǎn)能都沒(méi)有，僅找OEM代工就完全可以做得風(fēng)生水起。

相信很多投資者都對(duì)包括尚德在內(nèi)的幾家光伏大廠的股票頗為心動(dòng)，因?yàn)閺拈L(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)角度看，這些大廠在未來(lái)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)中不存在存活下去的問(wèn)題，而只要有能力活下去，就同樣有能力迎來(lái)這個(gè)行業(yè)的大發(fā)展，這是我們?nèi)w光伏人都從不懷疑的事情。只不過(guò)現(xiàn)在大家希望盡可能的抄底罷了。

白手起家，上市、擴(kuò)張，再到經(jīng)歷行業(yè)的起起伏伏，現(xiàn)在尚德年產(chǎn)能2.4GW,每天組件的生產(chǎn)量6MW，相當(dāng)于2003年全年的產(chǎn)量，無(wú)論今后的尚德之路怎樣，施正榮和他的尚德已然成為一段傳奇。版權(quán)申明：施正榮——不妥協(xié)的老大，系天晟國(guó)際傳媒有限公司旗下Shine《光能》雜志版權(quán)所有并授權(quán)發(fā)表。

Shi Zhengrong— Uncompromising Leader

At the beginning, I must state in advance that I am not writing a tendentious article on purpose. Maybe this is the first time that my focus is not on a company’s competiveness but on a company leader. But, the truth is that what Shi Zhengrong stands for is far more than just Suntech.

I think many people, just like me, know PV because of Shi Zhengrong. From attention to China wealthiest person in 2005 to curiosity to PV industry and finally a member in PV industry, in this 6 years, many investors and gold digger rushed into it, ups and downs, but Shi Zhengrong have been in the teeth of storm.

Lots of people and companies in PV industry now are new entrant like me. I remember that China woke up in the dream “energy for dollar” in 2006 and began to strike at enterprises with high energy consumption and pollution. The silicon industry, in which I was engaged, came to a standstill because of lack of money to pay for environment protection equipments. Then, 1 tons of Silicon produced roughly sold 1,000 dollars (then the foreign exchange of USD to RMB is about 8.3), and profit was only 300-500 yuan. I cited a sample for you to understand better here: many companies found they had no profit or made a loss after shipment if shipping cost or foreign exchange changed a little. So I was very surprised at the situation that companies shipped the PV modules by air without considering the cost in 2008.

Elimination of high pollution and high energy-consuming industries is the trend. I was also seeking my career transition then. Suntech went public in west Christmas carnival, and Shi Zhengrong became the wealthiest person with 18.6 billion yuan in China. He was familiar with people in the early 2006. After he signed the Bird Nest project in Beijing, media paid more attention to him. I saw that the silicon, 1 dollar/kg in China, was sold to overseas and purified to polysilicon, then we bought back at the price of 100 dollars/kg. This shocked and also hurt me, and meanwhile I saw more reports about Shi Zhengrong and Suntech. Of course, nobody knew polysilicon spot price would rise to nearly 500 dollars/kg in Q3, 2008.

Dazzling Preacher

At that time, public medium always are interested in Shi Zhengrong’s growing process. People are glad to see the success of grassroots. So, Shi Zhengrong, who was poor as a child, studied abroad in youth and established a business in forty, represented the “knowledge changes destiny” and became a typical overseas returnee hero with technology.

Shi Zhengrong made great contribution for China PV industry’s situation currently. At least 70% PV companies followed Suntech and entered into the PV industry. If you think it’s too overstated, you can just count the number of companies that were established or did PV business after 2005.

On the second SNEC, I saw Shi Zhengrong for the first time. Suntech gave great support to it. After the opening ceremony, Shi Zhengrong and several PV specialists were surrounded by lots of media. Then, Shi Zhengrong showed his ability to full extent and Suntech was powerful and prosperous. Even some strong players like Yingli and Trina Solar only is green leaves that set off red flowers.

Destruction Pursues the Great

Shi Zhengrong has always praised himself as big brother in PV industry, and the way he spoke and said seemingly means “If I can't do it, who can?”. For China PV industry, he really contributed too much, which included but more than China’s investment ecstasy simulated by Suntech’s success.

SolarWorld and the United Steelworders launched a variety of anti-dumping activities, especially SolarWorld. Shi Zhengrong went to Europe in 2009, hoping to resolve disputes, and also called for help when United States released 301 Bill.

Chinese always crave for greatness and success. PV companies’ bank credit was considered as bank loan by China companies intentionally and by United States’ companies unintentionally, and United States exaggerated this point in the new anti-dumping investigations. For these complaints, Shi Zhengrong said:”PV industry needs a united market mechanism, including trade dispute settlement mechanism.”

In fact, Suntech is the only company that has a chance to unify the whole China PV industry. The remarks of Shi Zhengrong also revealed that he was committed to cooperate with each other in PV industry. But until now, China P V industry still looks like a castle of sand sculpture, spectacular but vulnerable. Although we cannot blame Suntech, it is a pity after all. The reason is Shi’s character. But if we look more closely, the problem cannot be attributed to Shi and Suntech.

Once I described the PV players as mahjong players, including government, state-owned enterprises, large enterprises and small businesses. In this game, state-owned enterprises’ gambling money is provided by the government and government and large enterprises always send secret messages, so small businesses are in the isolated state, which is a common phenomenon in China. For example, dairy industry was forced to equipment with testing devices, and small companies that never had problem with dairy felled finally.

While almost all of the policies and standards are inclined to large enterprises, so few small businesses are willing to participate in industry associations. In association meeting in China, they were always leaders of several large enterprises that sited on the platform. In EUPVSEC in Hamburg, Germany and SPI in Dallas, USA, a small company showed the surprising low price-$1 and $0.89.However, I found nobody was interested in it, and the overall market price was pulled down.

If PV competition is compared to hunters chasing for deer, Suntech plays a dual role—the most powerful hunter and occasional deer, which once strained the relationship between Suntech and other players.

Deer Hunting Deer

Let us look back at the domestic large manufactures. If they can achieve win-win cooperation, China PV industry’s development will be more successful. After all, nobody is willing to bear the notoriety of “dumping” if he can make more money. However, Suntech failed to rein the powerful players. In other words, the current Suntech is nothing but the biggest fist. Why is it?

After Suntech was listed, a number of technical staff accumulated by Suntech became undoubtedly a gold mine of technician for new PV companies, but only Suntech was not enough to develop the whole gold mine and make them all jewelry. So in a period of time, no matter Suntech’s staff or management officers became the target of headhunter companies.

Yingli, which often compared with Suntech, is different, it is located in the north, in a single big state, and with the level near without competition, many employees reluctance to go abroad to work after they settle down, and the people of the north is relatively complex long for family serious; Jiangsu Province, where Suntech located is prosperous, and the staff is very convenient to other units to work, while southerners are more willing to make money with more effort. More importance is that Yingli is close to the route of state-owned enterprises model, so that gives the Chinese more sense of belonging; Suntech in this respect is tries hard to make international team, better adapt to the characteristics of the high degree of internationalization photovoltaic industry, but it also let employees liquidity also highly "internationalization". A good example to prove that: At the time of the financial crisis and the now in the market when trough, Yingli Shouted "don't payout, no job cuts" slogan, and Suntech is downsizing in disguised form to defuse the crisis.

The executives left or taken by other enterprises from Suntech in these years:
Yang Huaijin, also studied abroad in Australia with Shi and venture together home, later succession took office in Nanjing CLP(the predecessor of China Sunergy),JA Solar，and later appointed as CEO of Hareon Solar, helping Hareon Solar to enter the market successfully.

Zhang Fengming, Ted, the colleagues of Shi in Australia, have left and get into China Sunergy with Yang Huaijin ,working with Zhao Jianhua couple, Zhang Fengming current is the CTO of Tianwei group, and Ted founded Sunrise Global Solar Energy in Taiwan.

Wang Hanfei, Suntech's first professional manager, then Suntech scientific research personnel ready, government relations by Wuxi government support ,former chairman of LiYanRen to do, Wang Hanfei as Shi's assistant, do a lot of work. He invited by Liu Yonghua later, the boss of Solarfun (predecessor of HSOL), left Suntech in the middle of 2004, helped Linyang go public nasdaq in the United States. But he fall sick from overwork and die in July 2008 in his sleep. His death made Lu Yonghua grieved, his mind in the photovoltaic industry is also lower than before, later he transferred all equity twice at low profile.

Shao Huaqian, was secretary of Shi when startup, and do as vice President later, her left making shi rather felt sorry.

Chen Lizhi ,in Suntech five years, later took charge of vice President of United States company, responsible for American business development, lightning left in July this year.

Zhang Yi, Suntech's CFO, left this year.

As for the middle and operation workers, the loss situation is even more serious, that also creates various contradictions though not obvious between Suntech and other enterprises, but has always been there.

Just as the two sides of a coin, the turnover of Suntech's employees are not all come from the soliciting outside.

Shi Zhengrong and the CEO of Trina Solar Gao Jifan both praise the internationalized route, they will often emphasize Suntech or Trina Solar is not only a Chinese company, but should be viewed as an international company (as it does so, the Chinese listed enterprise, the Chinese photovoltaic equity accounts for only of the part, and a small; and to be Australian). They all are addicted to make a international team, so in Trina Solar and Suntech everywhere foreign staff as a management and foreign affairs work.

Shi Zhengrong and Gao Jifan artificial that China's photovoltaic industry every policy implementation and accomplishments adjustment, let the Chinese government attaches importance to photovoltaic industry for energy conservation and emission reduction successfully, China photovoltaic development plan from scratch, up until now the 50GW development goal by 2020.They lobbyed time after time, and invited the government official to visit factory to prove photovoltaic is clean and can help China of industry transformation of new industries. China's photovoltaic industry can start this year; Si and Gao are the biggest heroes.

But the market attitude of Suntech and Trina Solar can be summarized as "attention but not concentrated", their attention on domestic market is much less than overseas market, to market, both of them are tend to go upper line: making good relations with the government, so when there came good policies they could get benefit.

But if want to open international market further, Shi need a much more international team. In the Reuters website's Suntech executives list, CFO David comes from America's BECHTEL company, his last job is in Tetratech company; John Lefebvre took charge of the President of the United States company on September 26, once worked in SolarCity and GE; CBO Andrew Beebe, graduated from the United States, one of the most famous ivy university Dartmouth. The rest executives except Xie Xiaona have Wuxi government background, all come from the international famous companies and the university of new south wales.

A large number of airborne troops brought let Suntech unimpeded in international market, but it has also brought new problems: how to old employees and "airborne" between even-keeled? Shi said: "I will employ Chinese people as I can, but Suntech is facing the customers in European and American market, not China's coal mining area." When he was looking forward to making Suntech internationalization, he seemed to ignore these "coal mine workers" holds the Suntech's scientific research, financial, customers and government relations in every aspect. When understand China, know Chinese management model of "coal mine workers" leaves his post, Suntech's system, concept, easily formed in convey middle vacuum. There is something can be reference, and Suntech this year awarded to laboratory manager equipment Liu Huailin 1 million yuan award, explain he progress of science and technology to the attention, but there's a detail: in order to ensure that the company Liu Huailin product safety, the house was mortgaged to the bank obtain 800,000 yuan loans, research and development work after was able to carry on. To research and development concentration of Shi, why did Liu Huailin not declare the scientific research funds?

Before "dropped forces" is "air force", how to adjust to the mind now become "army", whether have so deep feelings to Suntech is unknown, the senior staff Suntech employed from BP, Siemens, PWC, and other enterprises with fat salary between 2006 and 2007 had already left more than half.

That embodies the contradictory mentality of Shi, on one hand, he hopes Suntech always maintain the explosive type growth, on the other hand also hope the old employees will be able to keep up with his international process, but even Shi himself will make mistakes in management, this problem is not unique to Suntech, but industry development too fast, from dozens of small factory of MW to China's richest man, then to the financial crisis and the 2010 outbreak of the market, and we all didn't realize that serious industry downs, photovoltaic industry trap and opportunities both existed. Senior analyst Doctor Lian Rui from professional analysis said:"The uncertainty of this industry is too big, so everyone should understand us for the deviation of the prediction."Shi also realized the problem, he said to media that he is hunting for a CEO, but this is easier said than done?

Uncompromising Leader

Shi's complex of "boss" has been accepted in the industry, of course, that along the way, only Suntech has the qualification. But he failed to be such a role as godfather, but more like the eldest son Sani who has personality hot and loves the family.

In the difficult process of Suntech going public, state-owned enterprises background overweight listed a big obstacle, for this Shi conflicted with former chairman Li Yanren, finally with the help of Wuxi Government, original shareholders just as LittleSwan dropped out, Li Yanren left, industrial in Wuxi had a bit criticism to this. Though I am not the parties, and have no comment about this, but think over when calm down, if not, could that Suntech become this Suntech today?

Shi Zhengrong warned that the industry will be surplus when it developed fast, most people think he just wanted to scare the competition and no one effusive; At the time that Yingli gave the super-low price of 0,69 yuan, Shi taunted it several times at the meeting before thousands of people, although it is hard to address, and it is said the price just for Proprietary Power, whether the error occurs also needs to be confirmed, but to the identity of Shi, these words just off his bearing.

From years of observation, Shi's character can be summed up as: a straightforward and some reckless, uncompromising idealist.

It is such a character, but also to Shi Zhengrong it has been calling for industry self-regulation, but it should be a handful. He admits: "We must avoid a concept: If the opponents are to death I can live better. This idea is naive, you can not put someone to death now, and the industry has been new entrants come in, my recommendations are: We should rational analysis of industry trends and their competitive advantage. "This should serve as industry arbiter of Suntech, but often dissatisfied with things to see taking up arms after the run ahead, allowing him to four enemies. This succession of industry circulating, such a thing: Shi had intended to elect a new post Energy Association, but it was called the Australian, non-compliance, and finally blocked.

Shi was also seen as the industry's most famous poison one of the tongue and the reason is that: he often said some including market pessimistic expectations and in some of the criticism of the phenomenon, he called that he often announces some immature prophecy. But unfortunately, all these years of history has proved that most of his words are right.

“Photovoltaic industry has bubbles, one is the wealth effect, and the second is the place to stoke the government."All these were put forward in 2007, no one believed.

“No market, how to have the factory!" The local government will question to photovoltaic industry as an important industry.

"Thin film solar is absolutely bubble; we should analysis who hypes film concept? Are there industry leaders and industry experts?" In 2009 when the film made Shi said film factory anger.

"No matter what industry, as long as the Chinese participate into, the production immediately goes up. If not pay attention to brand and business model construction, finally only 'people drink soup, foreigners eating meat'." 2009’s forecast, it is realized now, now and even in the future, the link will maintain at extremely low profit margins.

"The European demand falls," next year, global market will sure photovoltaic surplus." All these words were published in November 2010.

"PV industry still is unformed; you may be someone in the world today, but may be nothing tomorrow."

"The next two years will be sad," we have to get through the winter in two years. "Next year he is expected the solar panels inventory level will be up to 11 GW.

He also has many words that can cause the resonance of the language. Such as "bold" forecast 2011 China market will have 1.5 GW of capacity, "but he also said that I never expected it'd reached 3 GW; Forecast the electricity price is to a dollar per kilowatt hour, and now has become a reality. It has not been validation is he said 2015 China certainly is the world's largest market, the year capacity is 8 GW-10 GW, American has 6 GW or so, and China, U.S. and India will be the biggest photovoltaic markets.

He will say something everyone in the industry say how to spend the crisis, avoid malicious competition, establish industry system, the more he will say some people won't say, such as for domestic policy before was slowly down, some officials and government departments for not, some are lacking in initiative and overcautious enterprises compared the old total, he's a really different number.

As a media person, a bystander, the China brand of Suntech before a few years, the brand marketing can say not be very successful, the excessive apotheosis of Shi makes people dislike this story. People will feel all the apotheosis will unrealistic, compared the commercial unusual talent, we even takes Shi Zhengrong as a technology rich hero. Shi is one businessman who have the idealism color and take the solar industry as own responsibility, and he spares no effort for developing solar industry. (He made great effort for mass media PV-tech application, and did a great contribution), He admitted that he is also confusing, making mistakes, but why packaging himself as a perfect man?

After Yingli become the sponsor of World Cup, Suntech is also the sponsors of Zhufeng and other sports’ brands. Suntech doesn’t see Yingli having a good future. What is more, some writers will see Yingli’s "heroic victory" as a "hollowing out", let a person dumbfounded, although the words are not come from the will of Shi, but it further corrupts Suntech's image, this makes Yingli more implicative, just in the article of a counter that let readers compare the good or bad by itself, so said these words for the reasons that the information of Shi Zhengrong is easy to collect, but can get the detailed information from the low-key Yingling CEO, Miao Liansheng, just the internal personnel can get it.

This case after Zhang Jianmin was appointed for media relations manager become more improved, now of Suntech, is in a more generous eyes to look at interbank event, friction, meanwhile, Suntech also won more respect for the company.

Face to Face with Wrong

At the end of September, the 10 anniversary celebration ceremony of Suntech held, the energetic Shi Zhengrong feel some tired. Structure adjustment, strategic layout and a lot of negative news let him has no time to rest enough. He said: "in the last 10 years we have many auras, a lot of brilliant, because we are the boss, we also pay a lot for the boss’s price, and we also do a lot of exploration, there are success or the failures, for the follows, for the second, the third provides a lot of experience for reference. At the same time we also got a lot of questions, you are the big boss, you should do very well. We sometimes don't necessarily do very well, so the media friends forgive my indulgence." He won the applause, because in the past, there is had never been seen before. To the author's feeling is that he finally from the aura of go out, and given more reflection and summarized. Although his speech often still emphasize Suntech's leadership, but let person have a understanding laugh with bad feeling, if not so, he is not the Shi Zhengrong.

Although Shi admitted to making some mistakes, but some wrong I think cannot be attributed to him, before the news of "cheat donate" event with calm analysis, Suntech's operation if correct still have dubious, but the merchant's investment is always to return, in doing good and pursue maximization benefit when doing good is understandable.

Also let Suntech fell some distressed is terminate the contract with MEMC. All this is the sin of the war. In addition to TRW CEO Gao Jifan in the first half of 2008 is aware with a broken wrist, and give up thousands of millions’ poly project, there are no one fell the financial crisis’s risk. Including Q-cells、CSI and Nanjing CLP enterprises also sign a long contract with polysilicon enterprises. Remove the supply, let Suntech get rid of the shackles of the body in the longer term, when signing the 10 years contract with MEMC supply agreement, also taking the Suntech shares too, this "break up" with each other, on the one hand, it should be MEMC refused to negotiate, on the other hand, Suntech likes to refer the silicon chips parts in order to low down the cost. In 2006 we sign the contract with MEMC; the price of raw materials is cheaper by 20%-30%，but then we see the trend of raw materials in go down, if we put this contract go down, more than 400 million dollars were lost compared the spot price. Because five years ago, we had paid the advance payment 57 million dollars, the other part admitted we pay more than 60 million dollars until the contract ending. Totally we will pay 110 million dollars, and there will be 400 million dollars saved.

Suntech is struggling with a net debt burden of $130 m, the result of its expensive acquisition of wafer producer Rietech Solar in March. Rietech formerly known as Brilliant silicon energy. (wafer provider of Suntech) According to the company planning, total investment in the Rietech Solar plan could hit $1 bn. At present, it will reach a size of 1.23GW of production capacity with monocrystalline and polycrystalline in the first half of 2011, and reach 2.4 GW and 1.2 GW by separately for modules and sections in late 2011, also can say that its own wafer always maintain half of the quantity. Rietech will reach ultimately 3GW of production capacity.

Personally think that Shi actually invest to thin films at fault, After the short-term prospect downturn, he couldn't help developing thin film projects：Have been making thin films all his life, Suntech always what to make a breakthrough, but it accustomed to ‘number one’ be unable to bear technologically backward of father mainstream，from May 2007 to early 2011, Shi waste a great deal of time and resources, the project has eventually abandoned, in having always been a study films, as a scientist and a successful businessman who still loves be called Doctor more convincing to be absolutely unbelievable if that the project's viability can’t be analyzed, this Idealists still carrying the torch for his old occupations, even it still carry some risk. he endanger himself by going to get a gamble as much as possible, “I have been more than fifty years old, What do I dream” as a explorer, Shi said, for avoid unnecessary mistakes and complications for newly-comers, Suntech have still courage to admit their mistakes.

Chinese companies will have to spend some time practicing this and puts the emphasis on the research and development uses 5%-8% of sales incomes, as a result, after five years it appears again probably First Solar who has been approved by the market, while today PV market bear strong survival pressure. iI rest space for research have become smaller and smaller, like First Solar made a sensational product after be drowned themselves in the studies over the last 10 years, nothing can be replicate.

Medias compare often Shi with Yingli CEO Miao Liansheng who is in great contrast to former, it represents the conflict between different thought of Chinese and foreign enterprises. About smooth out the financial crisis, what is most distressing is how predictable all of this was, and how against the market crisis, Miao is by force very more than Shi.

The most difficult moment of the company that is in pioneering initial stage in faces to creditor went to him for the debt, Employees leave the company in succession, Miao was to see him being humiliated and bullied .While early Miao joined the Army, after leaving the army, he worked in at least six to seven types of jobs.

After more than twenty years training, ups and downs, from time to time, understanding about essential risk and market gave him to not be a second option, among the executives who in high class position in Yingli from the beginning of entrepreneurship, many still eat anything but carrot, as the old Yingli made a living by selling vegetables before a decade, part of their pay is taken out in these carrot for several months, Shi’s environment for entrepreneurship with only be described as paradise! ‘Technology heroes’, ‘quoted companies’, ‘the richest man in China’, etc, build such shrines round Shi within minutes of these titles, as a normal, he needs time to digest and accumulate.

The former vertically integrated model can be proud have already been generally adopted by the industry, in fact, Yingli tends more or less to make too much of its own problems, because pandas plans costs high, the principal attacking Fine silicon industry with glide as a result of Polycrystalline prices situation quickness but the consciousness about crises make no exceptions so he can always avoid huge, damaging losses without biting into muscle and bone.

Trina Solar could then looking a lot like Suntech’s models, Gao Jifan and Shi all embrace business goals: to create international brand decoration company! They also frowned on being referred to as ‘China company ’,but from Trina's operation does not seem to have big mistakes, and cost control might be better, so the internationalization route is being proved to be correct by practice to China. The cautious and cost control of Gao are the main reason.

With a strategic vision, not only does Shi give Suntech fame as a mirage, but bring numerous tangible benefits, then Shi overcoming objections to create GSF（Global Sola Fund）, This investment has surpassed US$ 200 million for Suntech while the first quarter of 2010, As the Maoist Idealists ,for the right and wrong merit of Shi Zhengrong there are much more enormous controversy than any enterprise inside the industry, Like Chair Mao, he opened a new epoch to allow PV industry to flourish, and give sense to some people such as Li Yuanchao in important jobs at national governments on PV, the industry have no official support in the expected to end; As Chair Mao, He lacked the pragmatism to follow-up construction, try to channel all energy into the world with the lack of details; now as Chair Mao hi also is stepping down altar, this is a good thing for him and Suntech.

Scenarios of non responsibility: Could Suntech be bought up?

South Korea based LG and Suntech have announced at the same time, deny the rumor that LG will buy Suntech, in fact, There were a huge number of press reports about such this case back to 2009, later that can be killed by the true, However, Now Shi is calmer than the previous special edition when respond these rumors include bankruptcy of Suntech. Image with non responsibility, which companies you supposed if Suntech agreed to a takeover? those would be the first North Korea in Korean currency reform in 17 years/Priority condition is that they would have industrial technology basis and understand The companies within the industry can be targeted in the shooting, so they would be polysilicon manufactures most probably /One way to do this is to just target a subset of those with the disease/We use the term bandwidth to represent such a frequency range

Believe that build the perfect industry chain after purchase with Suntech, then it will become more powerful. it seem those companies most likely to meet these criteria such as GCL OCI、REC、Hemlock and Wacker, etc. as Hemlock and Wacker do not appeared content with the status of PV industry at the moment, it thereby rest the former three most possibly, but personally think that Shi burnt never his own painstaking effort, just as those huge enterprises within the industry faced challenges after their time in the limelight so does the boss of Solarfun Power, Lu Yonghua which heart sank and turned cold with death of Wang Hanhua, how do others say goodbye to Tens of billions of assets they made themselves and more attractive prospects?

Others whispered that the negative news of Suntech were expanded specifically, also be deliberately speculation by the buyers want to acquire Suntech, how fact, be not yet known.

Should buy a few stocks?

In Suntech’s 10th Anniversary Celebrations, “Should buy more stocks of Suntech,” half-joking, said Li Junfeng, Director of the Energy Research institute of the National Development and Reform Commission, because the shares of some PV manufacturers fell at the lowest point includes Suntech, the value of theirs equipments and Plant alones were trading well over share prices at the moment.

No mention has been made of brand and channel of building by Li, as it should be noted these values with the accountability, Even if now without a watts of production capacity, only looks for OEM as an acting labour to produce, the business would little by little wind. Believe several major manufacturers’ stocks as Suntech back to the sales for many investors rather moved, in the long term, as a nuts that does not exist in these giants to survive in the father competition, they are only alive, would also be great developing in industry, our all PV players make never doubt of, if only we want only pick a bottom as possible or maybe “return a salute”.

Nobody gave Shi any money; he is a self-made millionaire, from listed in public to expand production, then has been lumpy for a bunch of reasons within the industry, Suntech has a capacity of 6MW of modules a day, that would have similar results in full financial year of 2003, Shi Zhengrong and his Suntech have already become a legend no matter what is going to happen on the road to the future.

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